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Introduction
Medical devices play an increasingly
vital role in health care delivery around
the world. These technologies are defined
in distinction to drugs as an ‘‘instrument,
apparatus…machine…implant…or other
similar or related article…which is…in-
tended for use in the diagnosis of disease
or other conditions, or in the cure,
mitigation, treatment, or prevention of
disease…and which does not achieve its
primary intended purposes through chem-
ical action’’ [1]. In recognition of the
importance of medical devices, the World
Health Organization established a Medi-
cal Device Unit to focus research and
policy on prioritizing access to medical
devices in low-resource settings, dessemi-
nation of innovations, and training of
biomedical personnel to support the use
of devices worldwide [2]. While medical
devices offer opportunities for improved
diagnosis and management of disease, they
also can carry substantial risks. Govern-
mental regulatory bodies considering new
medical device approval balance the goals
of expanding therapeutic options with
safeguarding public health. Wherever the
standard for market authorization is set,
questions about a device’s safety and
effectiveness will remain after introduction
into clinical practice. However, medical
devices raise several unique challenges,
including operator variability and proce-
dural learning curves, permanent implan-
tation, and the technological complexity of
some devices.
After a new medical device is brought
to market, the process of postmarket
surveillance (PS) provides an ongoing
assessment of safety and effectiveness.
High-profile international public health
crises involving widely used implantable
cardioverter-defibrillator leads [3,4], joint
prostheses [5], and breast implants [6]
raise questions regarding the strengths
and weaknesses of different approaches to
device PS worldwide. Though only limit-
ed quantitative measures of PS guide
policy decisions [7], we evaluated the
range of device PS strategies in four
important medical device markets—the
US, EU, Japan, and China. The US and
EU represent large markets that are
entertaining substantial reforms to PS
practice. Japan and China are, respec-
tively, mature and emerging international
markets that have systems that could
inform ongoing policy debates in the US
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Summary Points
N We evaluated strategies for postmarket surveillance of medical devices in the
United States, European Union, Japan, and China.
N Each system shares several common elements, including primary reliance on
passive adverse event collection for marketed devices, but vary widely in their
allocation of stakeholder responsibilities and mechanisms for evaluating the
performance and safety of approved devices.
N Postmarket surveillance may be improved through greater system transparen-
cy, scheduled re-examination of approved devices, and balancing central and
local control.
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and EU and be influenced by their
practices in turn. Our goal was to identify
‘‘best practices’’ from among these coun-
tries that could support the public health
goals of all device regulatory systems.
United States
After a device is approved in the US,
companies must maintain quality manu-
facturing control systems [8]. They must
also report to the US Food and Drug
Administration (FDA) adverse events
brought to their attention by their em-
ployees or user facilities [9], providing
patient demographic data, clinical infor-
mation, and procedure details. Reports
are collected in a publicly searchable
database, though with variable content
and quality. For example, most reports
originate from manufacturer representa-
tives, while health care providers have no
mandate to report adverse events, and
rarely do so [10].
The FDA may require manufacturers to
conduct PS studies in two ways. First,
‘‘post-approval studies’’ may be appended
to the approval of devices evaluated
through the premarket approval (PMA)
or Humanitarian Device Exemption
(HDE) pathways, which include high-risk
devices or those serving patients with rare
diseases, (respectively), where premarket
testing may be especially limited. Second,
so-called ‘‘522 studies’’ (named in refer-
ence to the relevant legislation) for select
devices (including those medium- or low-
er-risk devices cleared through the 510(k)
pathway based on risk or other criteria)
may also be required [11]. (In contrast to
the PMA or HDE processes, the 510(k)
process clears new devices based on a
principle of ‘‘substantial equivalence’’ to a
marketed device, indicating that the device
at issue raises no new safety or effective-
ness concerns. This process rarely requires
new clinical data [12].) FDA posts the
status of post-approval studies and 522
studies on public websites [13,14].
When PS points to potential device
problems, the FDA issues safety commu-
nications to inform patients and clinicians.
Actual patient harms trigger safety alerts
from the FDA, manufacturers, or distrib-
utors [15]; for example, a 2012 safety alert
described a defective component in an
automated external defibrillator that led to
unexpected failure to deliver high-voltage
therapy [16].
A recall reflects systemic concerns with
a device. A manufacturer may conduct a
recall on its own, or in response to an FDA
request, and is responsible for developing
the strategy for managing the recall
process. More serious recalls, such as those
issued for metal-on-metal designs for hip
prostheses [17], invoke stricter FDA over-
sight, including follow-up and auditing of
communication to providers or end-users.
Publicly searchable databases track safety
alert and recall information.
Recently, the FDA proposed adding a
unique device identifier (UDI) system to its
PS activities. UDIs allow linkage of specific
devices to clinical information that can
enhance the context of adverse event
reports [18]. UDIs might facilitate rapid
notification of devices’ use and perfor-
mance characteristics, support more accu-
rate and timely aggreggation of adverse
event data, and enable better coordiation
of recalls [19].
European Union
Devices are certified for marketing
approval by private, for-profit Notified
Bodies (NBs) around the EU based on
adherence to European Commission di-
rectives that describe standards for device
manufacturing, labeling, and expected
performance and safety profiles. Compe-
tent Authorities (CAs) in each member
state oversee NBs and have primary
responsibility for PS; there is no equivalent
to the FDA or the European Medicines
Agency for devices in the EU. Directives
also describe the basic standards for
manufacturing quality-control systems
and responsibilities for adverse event
reporting. Non-binding European Com-
mission guidance documents offer greater
detail regarding handling adverse events,
and communicating safety concerns. They
also provide templates for data collection
and reports, including ‘‘clinical evaluation
reports,’’ which are intended to provide an
outline of the technology underlying a
specific device and current clinical data
supporting its use, ideally in reference to
established standards or similar devices
[20]. In practice, each country variously
interprets the requirements for quality
assurance and adverse event reporting.
Manufacturers must report ‘‘any dete-
rioration in the characteristics and per-
formances of a device, as well as any
inaccuracies in the instruction leaflet
which might lead to or might have led
to the death of a patient or to deteriora-
tion in his state of health’’ to CAs where
the event occurs. A template outlines the
required information to be sent to CAs.
CAs must also have processes for collect-
ing reports from manufacturers, relaying
to manufacturers event reports submitted
to CAs by users, and assessing ongoing
risks associated with reported incidents or
recalls. Member states notify other states
if an assessment of device-related events
leads to specific remedial measures.
CAs submit adverse event and recall
data to the European Databank on
Medical Devices (EUDAMED), a central
but non-public database run by the
European Commission. Some CAs main-
tain independent publicly available data-
bases of device information. For example,
the UK Medicine and Healthcare Prod-
ucts Regulatory Agency (MHRA) keeps
adverse event and recall information in a
searchable web portal.
European Commission directives do not
grant authority to NBs or CAs to require
post-approval studies. NBs as part of their
review of individual devices can provide
guidance for PS, though there is no
evidence that studies or registry develop-
ment are commonly (or even occasionally)
required as conditions of approval. Nei-
ther the clinical data forming the basis for
approved devices nor the existence, if any,
of post-approval studies are systematically
publicized because there is no requirement
for NBs, manufacturers, or CAs to do so.
Manufacturers and regulators have
obligations under the directives to manage
adverse events and safety problems with
marketed devices. Field Safety Corrective
Actions (FSCAs) are ‘‘actions taken by
manufacturers to reduce a risk of death or
serious deterioration in the state of health
associated with the use of a medical
device’’ already on the market. These
actions range from changes in labeling to
withdrawal of products. Each CA must
disseminate National Competent Author-
ity Reports, which outline major safety
issues for medical devices for the CAs of all
member states.
Though not yet formalized into direc-
tives, recent European Commission sug-
gestions for device PS reform include use
of UDIs and connecting UDIs to EU-
DAMED. The provisions also include
improved coordination among CAs and
greater oversight of NBs, including clari-
fication of NBs’ responsibility and author-
ity to conduct unannounced inspections of
manufacturing facilities and audits of
collected documentation related to adverse
events.
Japan
Device regulation in Japan is led
centrally by two government agencies:
the Pharmaceuticals and Medical Devices
Agency (PMDA) and the Ministry of
Health, Labor, and Welfare (MHLW).
Under Japan’s Pharmaceutical Affairs
Law, MHLW has the authority to issue
PLOS Medicine | www.plosmedicine.org 2 September 2013 | Volume 10 | Issue 9 | e1001519
approvals for new devices and supervises
PS including adverse event reporting and
recalls. The PMDA provides the analytic
work that informs MHLW’s decisions,
including inspections and premarket eval-
uations. PS in Japan includes systems for
reporting foreign and domestic adverse
events, identification of safety signals
emerging from international markets,
and postmarket studies [21]. Manufactur-
ers are required to report adverse events
directly to MHLW, and are the source of
the overwhelming majority of these re-
ports. Manufacturers must also track and
report events that occur outside Japan for
similar or related devices. Health care
providers are required by law to make an
effort to cooperate with manufacturers
when they are actively investigating po-
tential safety problems [22]. Analysis of
reports by the PMDA may conclude that
further investigation is required, or impose
additional safety measures, such as chang-
es in labeling. PMDA hosts a public
database of adverse event and recall data
available, as well as a database for updated
package inserts [23].
PS studies may be required by PMDA
for select devices. Approval of particular-
ly risky devices may be paired with
requirements to actively monitor domes-
tic use of the device for up to five years,
or for a pre-specified number of cases.
Certain higher risk devices must ‘‘re-file’’
applications 3–7 years after initial mar-
keting approval [24]. Sponsors aggregate
information from health care providers,
clinical trials, and published studies—
such as foreign and domestic observa-
tional research or experiences from
registries—to demonstrate that the device
at issue is performing as intended and is
providing the expected safety and effec-
tiveness results. Theoretically, MHLW
can withdraw marketing approval after
a re-filing, though in practice this has not
occurred.
Recalls arising from domestic incidents
may include problems with documenta-
tion or reporting, as well as those related
to adverse events. Foreign recalls do not
automatically trigger a recall in Japan, but
if the sponsor is a global company,
marketing a device in Japan that has
been recalled elsewhere is generally un-
tenable.
China
The central government’s Ministry of
Health (MOH) is responsible for drafting
basic device oversight regulations and
overseeing their implementation through
the State Food and Drug Administration
(SFDA) [25], which was recently elevated
to a ministerial-level agency directly under
the State Council and renamed the China
Food and Drug Administration (CFDA) in
an effort to reduce fragmentation and
consolidate power [26]. Changes mostly
affected food regulation, but its govern-
mental promotion has granted drug and
medical device authorities more regulatory
capacity and ability to seek additional
resources [27].
Provincial and municipal agencies serve
as first-line responders when adverse
events are reported and support the
CFDA in monitoring and taking action
at the regional level [28]. The CFDA is
responsible for collecting, aggregating, and
analyzing adverse event data from across
all provinces and regions. Manufacturers,
distributors, and users of medical devices
must inform regional monitoring institu-
tions of death- and injury-related adverse
events [29]. Most cases appear to be
reported by medical institutions [30].
The CFDA hosts a central but non-public
online database that tracks adverse med-
ical events.
Product approvals are renewed qua-
drennially, using data gathered since the
initial registration. Regulations were re-
cently drafted to simplify this re-registra-
tion process by only requiring new
documentation to establish effectiveness
and safety of significant changes made in
relevant products. Device vigilance re-
ports consolidating and analyzing adverse
events related to these products must also
accompany re-registration [31]. Post-ap-
proval studies are required for certain
drug groups [32], but the CFDA has yet
to set similar requirements for medical
devices. However, manufacturers of new-
er imported medical devices have report-
edly been compiling outcomes data from
routine clinical experience, such as that
with newer generations of coronary stents
[33].
Device recalls are initiated by manufac-
turers based on self-investigation and
assessment of product defects, ranging
from eliminating defects through relabel-
ing or software upgrades, to full market
withdrawal [34]. The manufacturer regu-
larly updates regional authorities on the
recall status, and submits a summary
report after completion. For a medical
device that has caused severe injuries or
death, regional authorities and the CFDA
organize groups of representatives and
experts from device monitoring institu-
tions, manufacturers, and scientific re-
search teams to determine whether to
revoke the registration certificate. Manu-
facturers and companies are restricted
from securing regulatory approvals or
licenses for 2 years if they are involved in
manufacturing counterfeit or substandard
products, or if they cause serious safety events
due to violation of drug/device laws [35].
China’s regional structure grants sub-
stantial autonomy to provincial health
departments. For example, Shanghai has
developed a traceability program for
implantable medical devices, adopting a
UDI system linking implantable medical
devices directly to patients across over
100 hospitals. The database provides
detailed records of adverse events and
patients involved, allowing the CFDA to
hold back potentially dangerous products
while still in inventory and limit future
injuries [36].
Best Practices
These four PS systems share several
features (Table 1), including primary
reliance on passive adverse event collec-
tion for marketed devices. At a broad level,
these systems allocate responsibility among
stakeholders differently, with heavier bur-
dens on manufacturers in Japan and
China contrasting with significant author-
ity devolved to for-profit third-parties in
the EU. The US may lie between these
extremes, with the FDA mandate to
protect public health buttressed by obliga-
tions on industry. To date, no empirical
studies adequately characterize one system
as superior to another. However, we argue
that this comparative analysis suggests
three best practices with promise to
promote public health.
First, we found substantial variation in
public access to PS processes and data. On
one end of this spectrum, the US FDA
provides access to many high-risk PS
decisions through advisory panel meetings
and public ‘‘conditions of approval’’ for
select devices that include the design and
rationale of PS studies. For example, a
1,600-patient post-approval study was
mandated for a novel subcutaneous defi-
brillator system to address specific con-
cerns including shock effectiveness and
discrimination of arrhythmias [37,38]. As
this device is permanently implanted and
treats a life-threatening problem (ventric-
ular arrhythmia) for which an established
alternative (transvenous defibrillators) ex-
ists, a relatively cautious assessment of the
new technology was justified. These stud-
ies and their status are available on an
FDA website [39], though it remains
unclear how the content of these studies
will be released publicly.
The EU approach to the subcutaneous
ICD demonstrates the other end of the
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transparency spectrum. This device was
marketed in 2009 after a 55-patient study
demonstrating that the device worked as
intended [45]. It is not publicly known
which NB evaluated the device, the data
supporting its evaluation, and the nature
of PS plans, if any. (This device is not yet
approved for marketing in Japan or
China.) Since then, PS data have emerged
non-systematically from published ac-
counts of real-world clinical experiences
in Holland [40] and Germany [41]
totaling 187 patients. Though the newly
created clinical evaluation reports should
provide updates to marketed devices’
technical files, these reports are not made
public and their consistency, rigor, and
utility is not known. Indeed, a separate
industry has arisen to prepare and submit
clinical evaluation reports. As one website
reassures prospective clients, ‘‘If conduct-
ing a well-designed report seems daunting
and time-consuming, especially with No-
tified Bodies demanding updates on
commercial devices, let [us] help you.’’
[42]
Physicians, device safety researchers,
payers, and policymakers should be able
to access data supporting approval of new
devices, particularly high-risk devices, to
understand uncertainties related to safety
and effectiveness and the specific goals of
PS. Public accountability can also help
ensure that post-approval studies are
completed in a timely manner and pub-
lished in peer-reviewed venues or through
the regulatory authority itself.
Second, the requirement in Japan (and
evolving in China) that select devices re-
file with the regulatory authority after a
fixed time period offers another powerful
PS tool. Scheduled reassessment of accumu-
lated clinical experience allows regulators to
assess whether safety and effectiveness
expectations have been met. Reexamina-
tion supports review of labeled indications
or safety concerns, and also provides an
avenue for evaluating whether, in retro-
spect, the premarket process for a specific
device adequately anticipated safety and
effectiveness concerns. This knowledge can
provide feedback for that device’s premar-
ket review and inform future evaluation of
similar devices by influencing study design
and sample size calculations affecting safety
concerns.
An interesting case study of this ap-
proach to PS paradoxically comes from
the US, where in 2006, the FDA
convened an advisory panel to evaluate
current knowledge on the safety and
effectiveness for the two models of widely
used drug-eluting coronary stents [43].
This assessment followed emerging con-
cerns that these stents exposed patients to
previously unknown risks for late stent
thrombosis, a rare but catastrophic event.
This formal evaluation—held about 3
years after approval of these devices—
contributed to international momentum
for endpoint definitions applied to future
stent evaluation and PS. A scheduled re-
examination of novel ICD lead models—
before major recalls—perhaps would have
helped identify safety problems more
quickly, or at least provided more struc-
tured PS guidance. To our knowledge, no
device in Japan or China has been
removed from the market at the time of
its re-examination. Yet this may reflect a
strength of this approach, as manufactur-
ers faced with a strict deadline with
meaningful consequences are strongly
motivated to address post-market con-
cerns well in advance of the re-examina-
tion. Looking forward, we argue that a
scheduled re-examination for devices such
as transcatheter aortic valves, left ventric-
ular assist devices, or new hip prostheses
would support PS for these new therapies,
and may motivate completion of post-
approval requirements.
Novel, important technology needs to
be made accessible to patients, but it is
sensible to pair approval of select high-
risk devices with comprehensive, public
re-assessments of available safety and
effectiveness data at a predetermined
interval. Such meetings are likely to
be most effective when paired with
statutorily defined enforcement options,
including re-labeling, further study, or
withdrawal. These re-examinations hold
manufacturers and regulators accountable
for their decisions and subjects pre-
approval estimates of device performance
to scrutiny.
Third, the systems we reviewed strik-
ingly different balance between central
and regional control. The US system is
tightly centralized, so much so that states
have limited authority to impose addi-
tional requirements for manufacturers
[44]. By contrast, EU directives set broad
parameters, but assign responsibility to
CAs and NBs with loose coordination
and supervision. Perhaps as a result,
competition between NBs tends to focus
on speed and simplicity for manufacturer
clients. Resting between these extremes,
China’s centralized system maintains
strong central oversight while granting
some autonomy to provincial CFDA
agencies. This supports the role of
provincial health departments as the first
line of response to adverse medical
device events, yet allows for relatively
straightforward pooling of national-level
data. The existence of regional autonomy
Table 1. Key features of four device postmarket surveillance systems.
System Feature US EU Japan China
Transparency Premarket data and PS study
status for high-risk devices
publicly available. Public
databases for reported
adverse events and recalls.
Basis for device approval and
any postmarketing commitments
largely unknown. EU-wide adverse
event data not accessible, though
individual countries post PS
events in non-systematic manner
Public posting of approvals,
adverse event data, and
notices
Public website listing all
approved devices including
labeling, but clinical data and
collected adverse event data
not public
Formal
re-examination
Product performance reports
may be submitted from PS
studies registries, but no formal
process for renewing approval
for specific indications
Clinical evaluation reports
summarize PS data but are not
consistently produced and are
not used to evaluate renewal
of CE marking
Statutorily-required formal
re-examination period for
selected devices
Statutorily-required formal re-
examination period for selected
devices
Central versus
local control
Device regulation centralized
at FDA; individual states may
not impose stricter standards
on manufacturers for marketing
EU provides guidance but direc-
tives are interpreted by national
Competent Authorities and
private Notified Bodies
Centralized process organized
by Ministry of Health, Labor and
Welfare and its Pharmaceutics
and Medical Devices Agency
Central CFDA provides oversight
for provincial authorities,
however opportunities for local
initiatives exist
doi:10.1371/journal.pmed.1001519.t001
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within a centralized structure may create
faster responses to adverse events and
make implementing policy changes easi-
er, and may be worthy of exploration in
both the US and EU.
Conclusion
Even the most rigorous clinical testing of
experimental devices will leave some safety
and effectiveness questions unanswered. At
the same time, broader dissemination of
new technology and longer clinical experi-
ence may identify unforeseen concerns. For
example, many health policy discussions
around improving PS have urged regulators
to supplement passive collection of adverse
events with ongoing, dynamic assessment of
safety and effectiveness during the full life
cycle of marketed devices through mecha-
nisms such as UDI systems. However, these
strategies will take time to design and
implement. As device PS systems move
towards more active surveillance, our re-
view reveals important features of current
systems around the world that promote
coordination among regulators, manufac-
turers, clinicians, and patients. Broader use
of these strategies could preserve patients’
access to new technologies while protecting
them as well as possible from devices that
later turn out to be unsafe or ineffective.
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